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I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1980, the State of Florida was without any textual provision that
afforded its citizens a right of privacy. However, the Supreme Court of
Florida, at least to some degree, recognized that a right of privacy was
protected in some manner by the state constitution. Since the introduction
2
of Article I, Section 23, the right of privacy amendment to the Florida
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Florida has had many opportunities to
replace the arguably vague and ambiguous language of the mendment with
3
more concrete terms. J.A.S. v. State, decided in February of 1998, is one
recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in which the court had an
opportunity to express its views on privacy rights and, in particular, how
those rights relate to minors.4 Fundamentally, the J.A.S. decision is premised
upon a minor's right of privacy and how far the government may out stretch
its arm to limit that right.5 In order to understand the basis for the right to
privacy argument, it is important to consider the origin of the right to privacy
in the State of Florida.
1. David C. Hawkins, Florida Constitution Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the
State Bill of Rights, 14 NovAL. REv. 693, 826 (1990).
2. FLA. CONST. art I, § 23.
3. 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Unlike the right of privacy that the United States Constitution provides,
which emanates from the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 the Florida Constitution
specifically sets forth a right to privacy in Article I, Section 23.7 Article I,
Section 23 states that "[e]very natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
,8right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." It seems
important to mention that this amendment, proposed by the state legislature
and approved by Florida voters, apparently evidenced a strong commitment
on the part of Florida voters to protect privacy rights.9
This seemingly strong commitment on the part of Florida voters is
consistent with the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling in Winfield v. Division
of Pari-Mutuel Wagering,l0 where the court recognized the importance of
Article I, Section 23 by extending the highest standard of review to cases in
which the right of privacy is implicated.1 The court in Winfield set the
standard by which all subsequent cases dealing with the right of privacy
would be adjudicated. 2 The right of privacy was recognized by the court as
a "fundamental right," and as such, one that could only be limited based,, ,, .13
upon a compelling" state interest. The court then set the test by which an
alleged governmental intrusion into an individual's right of privacy would be
measured.' 4 Once a right of privacy is implicated the burden of proof shifts
to the state.'5 "The burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged
regulation serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal
through the use of the least intrusive means." 16 The Winfield court noted that
the right of privacy was not absolute and was subject to the compelling
interest of the state, which further cemented the power of both the individual
6. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
7. FLA. CONsT. art. I § 23.
8. FLA. CONST. art. I § 23.
9. Hawkins, supra note 1 at 826-27. "With the adoption of the privacy amendment,
Florida became the fourth state to create an express textual basis for the right of privacy. In so
doing, Floridians demonstrated a 'deeply protectionistic attitude' and assured themselves an
'independent, freestanding [and] fundamental' right of privacy." David C. Hawkins, Florida
Constitution Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 NOVA L. REV.
693, 826 (1990). (quoting Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595, 598 (Fla. 1981); Winfield
v. Division Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)).
10. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
11. Id. at 547.
12. Id. at 548
13. Id. at 547.
14. Id.
15. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
16. Id.
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and the state in this area. '7 Arguably, it was the suggestion of the court that
the mere implication of the right to privacy would not easily overcome the
potential strength of the state's interest.1
8
It is difficult to determine when an individual's right to privacy is
implicated, given the vagueness of Article I, Section 23. However, the
Winfield court stated that "before the right of privacy is attached and the
delineated standard applied, a reasonable expectation of privacy must
exist." 9 "A reasonable expectation of privacy"' and "the right to be let
alone" 21 give little guidance with regard to the implication of privacy rights.
However, the court in Winfield was willing to say that:
Since the people of this state exercised their prerogative and
enacted an amendment to the Florida Constitution which expressly
and succinctly provides for a strong right of privacy not found in
the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that the
right is much broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.22
Whenever the court determines whether privacy rights exist in any given
situation, based upon a "reasonable expectation of privacy," a broad or
narrow reading of Article I, Section 23 will result. Consequently, Article I,
Section 23 might be a vehicle for judicial legislation when the legislature
drafts imprecise laws that implicate an individual's right of privacy.
Regardless, the court has found privacy rights implicated in a diverse array
of areas from financial records to abortion.
In J.A.S., the court was essentially being asked whether these previous
findings supported the conclusion that a minor's right of privacy includes a
right to "consensual" sexual activity that outweighs the states compelling
interest in protecting minors from such activity. 2 4 Specifically, the question
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida in J.A.S. was:
WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 547.
21. FLA. CONST. art. I § 23.
22. Winfield, 477 So. 2d at 548.
23. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
24. J.A.S v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 1998).
Beck
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STATE INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE
MEANS?'
Briefly stated, J.A.S. involved two fifteen-year-old boys who had
"consensual" sexual intercourse26 with two twelve-year-old girls.27  These
facts triggered serious constitutional questions and raised doubts about the
consistency of prior court decisions.28
Part II of this article will focus on the cases which underscore the J.A.S.
decision. Part III of this article will dissect the J.A.S. decision, including the
district court opinion and the concerns outlined by the trial court. Part IV
will attempt to offer some rationale for J.A.S. and its progeny.
II. CASE LAW OVERVIEW
A. In re T.W.- A Minor's Right to Abortion
In re T. W. 9 was one of the first opportunities the Supreme Court of.... 30
Florida had to explore the right of privacy with regard to minors. T.W., a
fifteen-year-old minor, sought an abortion as a result of an unwanted31 3
pregnancy. Pursuant to section 390.001(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes,
32
T.W., as a minor, was required to obtain "written informed consent of a
parent, custodian, or legal guardian" or seek a judicial bypass in order to
25. Id. at 1382.
26. "Intercourse" is generally used to refer to any act which would constitute a
violation of sections 800.04 (Supp. 1991) and 794.05 (Supp. 1996) of the Florida Statutes.
27. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1382.
28. See id. at 1385-87.
29. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1192.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1189.
32. Florida Statutes section 390.001(4)(a)(1) (Supp. 1988) provides:
If the pregnant woman is under 18 years of age and unmarried, in addition to
her written request, the physician shall obtain the written informed consent of
a parent, custodian, or legal guardian of such unmarried minor, or the
physician may rely on an order of the circuit court, on petition of the pregnant
unmarried minor or another person on her behalf, authorizing, for good cause
shown, such termination of pregnancy without the written consent of her
parent, custodian or legal guardian. The cause may be based on: a showing
that the minor is sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to the
procedure; the fact that a parent, custodian, or legal guardian unreasonably
withheld consent; the minor's fear of physical or emotional abuse if her
parent, custodian, or legal guardian were requested to consent; or any other
good cause shown.
[Vol. 23:477
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obtain an abortion. 33 T.W. sought a judicial bypass on the grounds that "(1)
she was sufficiently mature to give an informed consent to the abortion, (2)
she had a justified fear of physical or emotional abuse if her parents were
requested to consent, and (3) her mother was seriously ill and informing her
of the pregnancy would be an added burden. 34 Using the standard of review
set forth in Winfield v. Pari-Mutuel Wagering, the court found the statute
unconstitutional because the state's interests were not "sufficienty com-
pelling under Florida law to override Florida's privacy amendment." The
court began its analysis of the case by citing Roe v. Wade,37 noting that this
landmark case announced "a right to privacy implicit in the fourteenth
amendment [which] embraces a woman's decision concerning abortion."38
The court stated that for section 390.001(4)(a) 39 to pass judicial scrutiny, it
must be reconciled with both the United States Constitution and the Florida
Constitution.4° However, the court reasoned that review under the Florida
Constitution was the most prudent starting point because unless the statute
could be held constitutional within the meaning of the Florida Constitution,
there would be no reason to determine whether it would pass scrutiny under
the United States Constitution.
The court started with the premise that a woman's decision to have an
abortion is a fundamental right, which is undoubtedly supported by the right
of privacy amendment in the Florida Constitution. More important to the
discussion of a minor's right of privacy, the court stated that the "freedom of
choice concerning abortion extends to minors.., based on the unambiguous
language of the amendment: The right of privacy extends to '[e]very natural
person."' 43 The court did, however, add the caveat that "[c]ommon sense
dictates that a minor's rights are not absolute." 44 Nevertheless, the court
declared that for section 390.001(4)(a) to pass judicial scrutiny and be held
constitutional, it must serve a compelling state interest by the least intrusive
means.
45
33. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
34. Id.
35. 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985).
36. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1194.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1190 (citing Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
39. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1988).
40. T.W.,551 So. 2d at 1190.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1193.
44. Id.
45. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1195.
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With regard to the interests of the state, the court was quick to note that
"protecting minors" and "preserving family unity are worthy objectives" yet
the court did not believe that these objectives were "compelling., 46 This
assertion relied upon other decisions holding that the above objectives were
not strong enough state interests to justify the imposition of a parental
consent requirement when minors sought other medical procedures, some of
which were potentially "life-or-death" decisions.4 7  The court found it
interesting that a minor may place a child up for adoption without parental
consent, a decision the court stated was "fraught with intense emotional and
societal consequences. 48
The court also found that neither parental consent nor a judicial bypass
was the least intrusive means to protect the state's interests and, therefore,
was contrary to the test set forth in Winfield.49 The court seemed to suggest
that the procedural pitfalls of the statute rendered the statute unconstitutional
with regard to its intrusiveness.50  Specifically, the Court found "[i]n
proceedings wherein a minor can be wholly deprived of authority to exercise
her fundamental right to privacy, counsel is required under our state
constitution.' ' Therefore, statute 390.001(4)(a) did not seek the interests of
the state by the least intrusive means because it neither made a "provision for
a lawyer for the minor or for a record hearing. ' 2
It might be argued, that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in
T. W. expressed strong support for a minor's right of privacy, especially in
the area of personal autonomy. When the court ruled that a minor could
access abortions, free of parental consent or judicial intervention, via a• • • 53 ...judicial by-pass, it seemingly indicates a commitment by the court to
advance increased freedom for minors within the realm of intimate personal
relations. The T.W. holding opened the door for future litigants to assert
their contention that minors may consent to intercourse. Arguably, if the
court was willing to allow a minor to deal with the possible ramifications of
sexual intercourse, for example, abortion or adoption, it would also seem
logical that the court would allow a minor to lejally consent to sexual
intercourse, which could lead to those consequences.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. T.W.,551 So. 2d at 1195.
51. Id. at 1196.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See infra note 71.
[Vol. 23:477
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B. Jones v. State- "Adult-Minor" Statutory Rape
Clearly, the defendant in Jones v. State55 believed the decision in T.W.
afforded expansive privacy rights for minors, when he argued that the
holding in T.W. supported the conclusion that minors may consent to sexual
relations.5 6 Jones, an eighteen-year-old, was charged with statutory rape
57
under section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes,58 which states in relevant part
that an individual may not, among other things, have "sexual intercourse"
with a "minor under the age of 16" and that "the victim's consent" is not a
defense.9 Jones was charged and convicted of violating section 800.04, as a
60
result of having sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of sixteen.
Jones appealed and questioned the constitutionality of section 800.04
because it made no provision for consent on the part of the minor in
violation of the minor's privacy rights.61 Essentially, he argued that because
T.W. afforded a minor the unrestricted right to an abortion, it was only
logical that a minor could consent to sexual intercourse. 62 The Supreme
Court of Florida disagreed with Jones's reading of the T.W. decision and
55. 640 So. 2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. 1994).
56. Id. at 1087.
57. Id. at 1085.
58. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in
presence of child.-Any person who:
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of 16
years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual
intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, actual
lewd exhibition of the genitals, or any act or conduct which simulates that
sexual battery is being or will be committed upon any child under the age of
16 years or forces or entices the child to commit any such act;
(3) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.011(1)(h) upon
any child under the age of 16 years; or
(4) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any
child under the age of 16 years, without committing the crime of sexual
battery, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided
in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. Neither the victim's lack of
chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by
this section.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1085.
61. Id. Jones had standing to make his assertion because of precedent, which stated
"sellers of obscene materials had vicarious standing to raise the privacy rights of their
customers." Id.
62. Id. at 1086-87.
Beck
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found section 800.04 constitutional. 63 The court stated that "T.W. did not
transform a minor into an adult for all purposes."
64
Though the plurality opinion of the court never addressed the question
directly, the opinion suggested that a minor's privacy rights did not extend to
sexual relations. 65 However, the court did say "Florida has an obligation and
a compelling interest in protecting children from 'sexual activity and
exploitation before their minds and bodies have sufficiently matured to make
it appropriate, safe and healthy for them."' 66  The use of the phrase
"compelling interest" with respect to privacy rights should arguably have led
to a Winfield analysis, yet the court never spoke in terms of privacy rights
and, thus, one might conclude that no such privacy right exists with regard to
minors and "consensual" sex.
For more guidance, Justice Kogan, in his concurring opinion, stated
quite clearly that "T. W., in sum, does not create a right for young adolescents
to 'consent' to sex.6 Kogan illuminated the heart of section 800.04,
something the plurality had trouble doing, when he pointed out that the
purpose of section 800.04 was to "prevent children and young adolescents
from being exposed to the wide-ranging risks associated with sexual
exploitation and premature sexual activity." Kogan also reasoned that in
T.W. the court found the irrational application of section 390.001(4)(a)
69
problematic because minors could consent to certain types of dangerous
medical procedures but they could not consent to abortion without running a
procedural maze.70 He found it ridiculous to suggest that the T.W. decision,
one designed to help minors deal with the consequences of sexual activity,
supported the conclusion that minors could consent to intercourse. 71
By contrast, Kogan explained that the purpose of section 800.04,72 to
protect minors from "predatory exploitation," "clearly outweighs whatever
63. Id. at 1087.
64. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1087 (quoting Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1993)(Sharp, J., concurring specially)).
67. Id. at 1087 n.5 (Kogan J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1088 (Kogan, J., concurring).
69. FLtA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1988).
70. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 (Kogan, J., concurring).
71. Id. Some have argued that recognizing a minor's right to an abortion, however
limited that right may be, necessarily means there is a corresponding right for minors to
engage in "consensual" sex. Such an argument is no different than saying that, because
minors have a right to consent to alcohol-and drug-abuse treatment, § 397.601, FLA. STAT.
(1991), they also must have a right to consume alcohol and ingest drugs in the first instance.
This is an unsupportable brand of logic. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 n.5.
72. FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1991).
[Vol. 23:477
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/10
1998]
'right' children may have in consenting" to sexual activity. 73 Justice Kogan
then went on to explain the effects of such exploitation, highlighting studies
indicating the pervasive nature of sexual abuse of children and the far
reaching results such abuse has on children who are affected by it.74 Further,
Kogan explained the merits of the legislature's "bright-line cut-off at a
specific age" with regard to an individual's ability to give consent to
intercourse.75  So long as that age is "within a range that bears a clear
relationship to the objectives the legislature is advancing," he reasoned that
the legislature must choose an age at which an individual can understand the
ramifications of certain critical and life long decisions, such as consenting to
intercourse.
76
The plurality opinion in Jones clearly expressed the view that section
800.04 is constitutional, albeit with little clear-cut reasoning. Justice
Kogan's concurrence offered a lengthy explanation with regard to the
soundness of section 800.04, but his reasoning did not gain the full support
of the court.77 Though the rationale of the Supreme Court of Florida was not
clear from the Jones decision, it appeared that the court was committed to
protecting minors from sexual activity by not recognizing any right to
engage in "consensual" intercourse. This might have been a fair
assessment of the court's reasoning had Jones been the final word on
whether a minor could "consent" to intercourse.
C. B.B. v. State- "Minor-Minor" Statutory Rape
The court's decision in B.B. v. State7 9 appeared to call into question
whether the court was truly committed to preventing minors from80
participating in consensual intercourse. The facts in B.B. are strikingly
similar to those of Jones, yet the result was completely opposite.81 B.B., a
sixteen-year-old, was charged with having sexual intercourse with another
73. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1088 (Kogan, J., concurring) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590
So. 2d 404,418-19 n.17 (Fla. 1991) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). "Some
studies, for example, indicate that 5 to 9 percent of males and 8 to 28 percent of females in the
general population report that they were sexually exploited as youths." Jones, 640 So. 2d at
1088 (Kogan, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1088-89 (Kogan, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1089.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id. at 1087.
78. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
79. 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
80. Id. at 257.
81. Compare B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995), with Jones v. State, 640 So.
2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
Beck
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82
sixteen-year-old. B.B. was charged under section 794.05 of the Florida
83Statutes, which states in relevant part, "[a]ny person who has unlawful
carnal intercourse with any unmarried person, of previous chaste character,
who at the time of such intercourse is under the age of 18 years, shall be
guilty of a felony .... ,84 B.B. beckoned the court to find section 794.05
"unconstitutional as violative of his right to privacy. 86 The court seemingly
agreed with the assertion of the petitioner, finding section 794.05
unconstitutional. 7
In both Jones and B.B., the court was dealing with statutory rape
statutes.88 It was undisputed that the individuals had intercourse with minors
under the statutory age, yet in Jones the court held the statute constitutional
and thus upheld the conviction 89 and in B.B. the court held the statute
unconstitutional and remanded the decision. 90 It seems quite logical to
conclude, "the court arrived at diametrically opposed results."9' Practically
speaking, this conclusion seems sound. However, the court's decisions,
when examined, indicate that the court had little choice given the language
of section 794.05 and the factual distinction between B.B. and Jones.
In both cases the court clearly stated that it would not and was not
92
endorsing consensual intercourse between minors. In Jones, the court
82. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 257.
83. Florida Statute section 794.05 (1991) provides:
Carnal intercourse with unmarried person under 18 years.-
(1) Any person who has unlawful carnal intercourse with any unmarried
person, of previous chaste character, who at the time of such intercourse is
under the age of 18 years, shall be guilty of felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(2) It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the
prosecuting witness was not of previous chaste character at the time of the act
when the lack of previous chaste character in the prosecuting witness was
caused solely by previous intercourse between the defendant and the
prosecuting witness.
FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991).
84. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1991).
86. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
87. Id. at 260. "Thus, we do not hold that section 794.05 is facially unconstitutional
but only that it is unconstitutional as applied to this 16-year-old as a basis for a delinquency
proceeding." Id.
88. Id. at 257, 259.
89. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
90. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
91. Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
67, 108 (1995).
92. See B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258; Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087.
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stated that "TW. , in sum does not create a right for young adolescents to
'consent' to intercourse." 3 In B.B., the court maintained, in dictum, that "if
[their] decision were based upon whether minors could consent to sexual
activity as though they were adults, [their] decision would be 'no.' ' 94 This
quote raises the obvious question, upon what was their decision based?
The answer to this question appears to lie within the somewhat subtle
differences between the factual circumstances giving rise to each case. First,
the court framed the issue in B.B. so that they would not have to reach the
question of whether minors may consent to intercourse. 95 Second, as
previously stated, Jones and B.B. were charged under different statutes, a
fact that would prove extremely important.96  Next, the court in B.B.
unequivocally stated that section 794.05 implicated B.B.'s privacy rights and
therefore required a thorough Winfield analysis, a step not truly taken in
Jones.97 Finally, the defendant and the victim in B.B. were both minors,
whereas the defendant in Jones was an adult.98 These factors coalesced and
led the court to its conclusion; a conclusion one might argue was
manufactured to avoid a question the court did not want to 
answer.9
The question certified to the Supreme Court of Florida, by the Second
District Court of Appeal, was whether "Florida's privacy amendment, article
I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution , render section 794.05...
unconstitutional as it pertains to a minor's consensual sexual activity?" 10°
However, the Supreme Court of Florida stated the issue to be "whether a
minor who engage[d] in 'unlawful' carnal intercourse with an unmarried
minor of previous chaste character can be adjudicated delinquent of a felony
of the second degree in light of the minor's right to privacy guaranteed by
the Florida Constitution."'  The difference between the question certified
and the issued ruled upon, seemingly infinitesimal, was actually infinite.
The court removed the question of "consensual activity" and refocused the
issue toward the nature and language of the statute as it pertains to the right
of privacy in Florida with regard to minors.1°2 This essentially allowed the
court to withhold judgment on the issue of consensual intercourse between
minors. Having changed the question presented, the court set out to answer
93. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1087 n.5 (Kogan J., concurring).
94. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
95. Id. at 257.
96. Id. at 258.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id. at 259.
99. After B.B. it was truly unclear how courts were going to deal with minors
engaging in sexual intercourse and subsequently being charged with statutory rape.
100. State v. B.B., 637 So. 2d 936, 937 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
101. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 258.
102. Id.
1998] 489
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its own contrived question. It should be noted that Justice Harding dissented
based on the court's failure to reach the actual question presented. 0 3 He
also suggested that the court would have had to find the statute constitutional
if it had answered the certified question.
104
Having first reiterated the court's assertion in T.W., that the right of
privacy extends to minors, the court then moved to the question they failed
to definitively opine upon in Jones, that is, whether a right of privacy is
implicated with regard to minors and "consensual" intercourse.105 It would
seem that the court's position with regard to whether a right of privacy exists
in "consensual" intercourse between minors is clearly stated in their
assertion "that Florida's clear constitutional mandate in favor of privacy is
implicated in B.B., a sixteen-year-old, engaging in carnal intercourse."
106
Thus, the court was willing to say that a minor's right to privacy was
implicated when that minor engaged in consensual sexual activity.'07
However, the court went no further with this line of thought.
08
Rather, the court then focused upon two key distinctions between B.B.
and Jones, which allowed them to dodge the broader issue of minor's
"consenting" to intercourse.1°9 First, the court explained that the compelling
state interest in Jones was protecting a minor from the sexual exploitation of
an adult. 10 By contrast, the court held that the interest in B.B. could not be
sexual exploitation because both the defendant and victim in B.B. were
minors." Rather, the court recognized the state's asserted interest was
"protecting the minor from the sexual activity itself for reasons of health and
quality of life."
1
'
2
Having placed the interest of the state in these terms, the court
concluded "that the State ha[d] failed to demonstrate in this minor-minor
situation that the adjudication of B.B. as a delinquent through the application
of section 794.05 [was] the least intrusive means of furthering what we have
determined to be the State's compelling interest."" 3  To reach this
conclusion the court pointed to the archaic language of the statute, which
essentially created a preferred class of minors. The court found it
103. Id. at 262 (Harding, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 258.
106. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 258-59.
110. Id. at259.
111. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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impossible to reconcile the fact that the alleged purpose of the statute was to
protect minors from the dangers of sexual activity, yet the statute only
extended to those minors of "chaste" character.115 As a point of clarity, the
court wished to add, "[w]e do say that if our decision was what should be
taught and reasoned to minors, the unequivocal text of our message would be
abstinence."'1 6  The court was restrained by what it reasoned was
constitutionally sound, not wanting their opinion to be based upon their own
moral or political views, a noble approach for Florida's high court, yet a
confusing notion for most.
Some perspective on the potential pitfalls of adjudicating minors
delinquent in minor-minor statutory rape cases might be gained by the
assertions of Justice Kogan's concurring opinion and Chief Justice Grime's
dissent. These opinions have particular weight with respect to the J.A.S.
court's decision and arguably strike at the heart of the minor-minor statutory
rape debate. Justice Kogan offered, with respect to who should be charged
in minor-minor statutory rape cases, that "[a]ttempting to brand one as the
aggressor and the other as the victim raises very serious questions of equal
protection, especially where prosecutors always assume that one type of
child-such as 'the boy,' or the one who is 'uncha'ste'-must be the
aggressor."'1 7 Chief Justice Grime's fear of events to come might easily be
115. Id.
Thus, by its own terms the statute at issue here does not protect unmarried
minors who had lost their virginity through a liaison with a third party prior
to the act in question. This singularly odd state of affairs indicates that the
real objective of this statute is not to protect children as a class, but to prevent
the loss of chastity of those not already 'despoiled'. Any person-child or
adult--thus does not violate this particular statute by a sexual liaison with an
unchaste minor.
B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260 (Kogan, J., concurring).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 261 (Kogan, J., concurring). Justice Kogan's statement raises serious
concerns about the inherent potential for equal protection violations when one minor is
singled out and charged with statutory rape in minor-minor situations. Id. Although Justice
Kogan raised the equal protection issue, he did not analyze this potential problem under either
the Florida or United States Constitution. However, the United States Supreme Court has
opined with respect to equal protection and statutory rape statutes. See also, Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma Couny, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), which held a statutory rape statute,
which only applied to males, constitutional despite the argument that the statute violated the
equal protection clause because "the gender classification [was] not invidious, but rather
realistically reflectfed] the fact that the sexes [were] not similarly situated in certain
circumstances" particularly, "that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy f[e]ll
more heavily on the female than on the male." Id. at 464. However, Michael M. dealt with a
statute that facially discriminated against males, whereas, Florida's statutory rapes statutes are
facially neutral. See also, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (asserting that "our
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evidenced by his response that "holding section 794.05 unconstitutional as
applied, the majority appears to be saying that a sixteen-year-old child has a
constitutional right to engage in sex with another sixteen-year-old child,
though an older person would not have such a right."118 The Chief Justice
also noted that, if convicted, B .B. might have a viable challenge based upon
cruel and unusual punishment.1 9 Further, Chief Justice Grime's fears might
not have been assuaged when the Florida Legislature changed the language
of section 794.05. The relevant change came by way of removing any
language relating to "chaste character" and clearly prohibiting an adult over
the age of twenty-four from having sexual relations with a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old.1
20
In many ways the trepidation found in both Chief Justice Grime's
dissent and Justice Kogan's concurrence are in essence the true problems
when dealing with statutory rape, where both victim and accused are minors
claiming consent. The court must deal with the problem of who is the victim
cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to
whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact"). Applying this line of thought, it might be argued that the
mere fact that boys are charged more often might not be sufficient to sustain an equal
protection claim. Rather, the party challenging the statute on equal protection grounds would
apparently have to demonstrate purposeful activity on the part of the State of Florida to charge
males. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
118. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 262 (Grimes, C.J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1996).
Unlawful sexual activity with certain minors.
(1) A person 24 years of age or older who engages in sexual activity
with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in
this section, "sexual activity" means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or
in union with, the sexual organ of another; however, sexual activity does not
include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to a person 16 or 17
years of age who has had the disabilities of nonage removed under chapter
743.
(3) The victim's prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a
prosecution under this section.
(4) If an offense under this section directly results in the victim giving
birth to a child, paternity of that child shall be established as described in
chapter 742. If it is determined that the offender is the father of the child, the
offender must pay child support pursuant to the child support guidelines
described in chapter 61. Id. (It seems that this change does in fact allow a
sixteen-year-old to engage in sexual intercourse with another sixteen-year-
old.)
FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (1996).
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and who is the victimizer, but remain mindful of the equal protection
implications. The court must also balance on the very thin line between
constitutionally entitled activity and endorsing intercourse between minors.
Essentially, the three cases outlined above, T.W., Jones, and B.B., placed the
court squarely in the middle of this very confusing and sensitive problem and
set itself up to ultimately decide the issue of "consensual" intercourse
between minors. After B.B. was decided, the court's record on the issue of a
minor's right to privacy was not quite clear. They had allowed minors the
unrestrained right to abortion, then failed to recognize any consensual
right to intercourse with respect to minors and adults, 2 2 and finally struck
down a statute that allowed a minor to be charged with statutory rape of
another minor.
23
III. J.A.S. V. STATE-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Trial and District Court
State v. J.A.S124 may have been the court's opportunity to finally
determine the issue of adjudicating minors delinquent of so called "minor-
minor" consensual intercourse. The facts surrounding the case were
relatively simple. Two fifteen-year-old boys had "consensual" intercourse
with two twelve-year-old girls and were charged with statutory rape under
section 800.04, the same statute applied in Jones.125 Perhaps relying upon
the B.B. decision, the trial judge mirrored the sentiments of the concurrence
and dissent. He found section 800.04 unconstitutional as applied to both
minors in J.A.S., because section 800.04 "violated their right to privacy and
equal protection under the law" and because "the potential sanction was
grossly disproportionate to the crime and would constitute cruel and unusual
punishment."' 6 The trial court's line of thought might seem predictable,
given the suggestions of the B.B. court. However, the district court was
unmoved. The district court was quick to dismiss the assertions of equal
protection and cruel and unusual punishment, but could not be as dismissive
with the right of privacy issue.
27
The court first found it unreasonable for the trial judge to have
assumed, based solely on his "experience of five years as juvenile judge,"
121. In reT.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,1188 (Fla. 1989).
122. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994).
123. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
124. State v. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
125. Id. at 1367.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1367, 1369.
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that "whenever sexual misconduct is charged between the opposite sexes, the
boys are always charged by the state. ' 128 Further, because the defense
presented no evidence to support such a conclusion, the State had nothing
tangible to dispute. 129 The State did, however, present evidence that one of
the juveniles charged had had extensive juvenile "referrals" and "previously
engaged in intercourse with the victim's [thirteen-year-old] sister."'' 30
Apparently, this was the court's way of saying the State had accurately
charged the victimizer and therefore there were no equal protection
problems. Regardless, the court stated that choosing who would be charged
was a matter of the prosecutor's discretion.' 3' 132
The court then moved to the issue of cruel and unusual punishment.
Essentially, the court said that they could not say whether the juveniles
would be subject to cruel and unusual punishment because the trial court
dismissed the charges against the juveniles. 33 Further, they stipulated that it
might be appropriate for the juveniles to be punished harshly if the crime
they committed warranted such punishment.
34
The court finally addressed the question of privacy rights when both the
defendant and the victim are minors. The court did not apply the Winfield
test, which they recognized was the proper means to address a right to
privacy question. 136 Rather, the court focused upon whether it was proper to
charge a minor under section 800.04.137 The court recognized the inherent
problem a court faced when adjudicating one minor a delinquent in "minor-
minor" statutory rape cases. 138 However, the court had both precedent and
the indecision of the state legislature to rely upon.139
128. Id. at 1367.
129. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1369.
137. Id. at 1368.
138. Id. at 1369 n.2. The court in J.A.S. recognized:
[t]he potential incongruity of punishing one under 16 who is supposed to be
protected from the sexual advances of others because of his or her age and
inability to fully consent to sex, equally with one 16 or 60, who is presumed
to be of an age and maturity to understand his sexual decisions.
J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1369 n.2.
139. Id. at 1369 "The failure to enact any legislation before retiring from the 1996
session indicates to us that the members of the legislature have no better idea of how to deal
with problem than that adopted by L.L.N." The fact that the debate in the legislature existed
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Citing precedent set forth in L.L.N. v. State,'40 the court denied any
attempt to claim that section 800.04 was constitutionally vague with respect
141to minors. In L.L.N., a minor, charged under section 800.04, unsuc-
cessfully claimed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
was being used to "prosecute a member of the protected class." 142 The court
was quick to note that the Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari in
L.L.N., imVlying that the high court was satisfied that L.L.N. was decided
properly. 1 3 The court also suggested that the failure on the part of the
legislature in the previous term to decide whether it is proper for minors to
be charged under section 800.04 was proof that the legislature realized a
problem existed and that they, too, had no better solution than that used by
the courts. 144 However, the court recognized in B.B. that the Supreme Court
of Florida found it problematic to adjudicate a minor delinquent in a statu-
tory rape case because of the potential penalties involved.1 45 Regardless, the
court believed that the B.B. decision was inconclusive with regard to the
potential penalty and therefore suggested that the Supreme Court of Florida
wished to leave the question to the legislature.146
The court seemed to endorse the view that minors can be con-
stitutionally charged and convicted under section 800.04 because of the
strength of the statutory language and the apparent commitment on the part
of the Supreme Court of Florida to prevent "consensual" intercourse
between minors.' 47 Although the district court did vacate the dismissal of
the trial court, it is difficult to grasp the rationale that motivated their
findings. Particularly, because the court certified the following question to
the Supreme Court of Florida:
suggested to the court that "the legislature [was] aware of the serious problem of sexual
activity among minors." Id.
140. 504 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
141. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368 (citing L.L.N. v. State, 504 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1987)).
142. L.LN., 504 So. 2d at 7.
143. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368.
144. Id. at 1369.
145. Id.
146. Id.
[The current supreme court was unable to accept the potential penalty
appropriate for an adjudication of guilt of a second degree felony in B.B. The
result attained in B.B. was to refer the matter back to a legislature that was
unable to resolve the matter during its entire 1996 session.
Id.
147. J.A.S., 686 So. 2d at 1368. "Ihe conclusion to be drawn from the supreme court's
statements in B.B. and the legislature's statement in section 800.04 is that sexual activity
between minors is prohibited whether or not each of the participants believe that they have
'consented."' Id.
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WHETHER THE POTENTIAL PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 800.04, FLORIDA STATUTES, BY A MINOR
UNDER THE AGE OF SIXTEEN FURTHERS A COMPELLING
STATE INTEREST THROUGH THE LEAST INTRUSIVE
MEANS.
48
B. The Supreme Court of Florida
The factual circumstances of B.B. and J.A.S. are similar because they
both deal with minors charged with statutory rape based upon "consensual"
intercourse with other minors.149 The court's conclusion in B.B., that the
state's compelling interest was not furthered by the least intrusive means by
adjudicating B.B., a minor delinquent,1 50 might lead one to reason that
J.A.S., a minor, would not be adjudicated delinquent. However, in J.A.S. the
court "conclude[d] that section 800.04, as applied herein, furthers the
compelling interest of the State in the health and welfare of its children,
through the least intrusive means, by prohibiting such conduct and attaching
reasonable sanctions through the rehabilitative juvenile justice system."'
Support for the court's conclusion was essentially derived from
distinguishing B.B. from J.A.S. and explaining the similarities between J.A.S.
and Jones.' 
52
The court began its discussion by outlining their holdings in both Jones
and B.B. and explaining why those holdings support the J.A.S. decision.1
53
154The court stated that section 794.05, the statute used to charge B.B., was
designed to protect minors from adults. 155 Because B.B. was a minor,
prosecuting B.B was not furthering the purpose of the legislation. 56 Though
both defendant and victim in J.A.S. were minors, the court found a
distinction between J.A.S. and B.B. in the fact that B.B. dealt with two
sixteen-year-olds, while J.A.S. dealt with two fifteen-year-olds (the
defendants) and two twelve-year-olds (the victims).1 57  This factual
distinction between the cases proved extremely important because the court
found that "twelve-year-old children are entitled to considerable protection
148. Id. at 1370.
149. Compare J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381, 1382 (Fla. 1998) with B.B. v. State,
659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
150. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 259 (Fla. 1995).
151. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1386.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1383-85.
154. FLA. STAT. § 794.05 (Supp. 1996).
155. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1384.
156. Id. at 1385.
157. Id. at 1386.
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by the State, even when some of them resist its extension to them."'158 Of
course, one wonders if the court was suggesting that a sixteen-year-old was
not entitled to the same protection.
In B.B., the court explained that "[s]ection 794.05 is not being utilized
as a shield to protect a minor, but rather, it is being used as a weapon to
adjudicate a minor delinquent."'159 In J.A.S., the court summarily found that
"section 800.04 is being primarily utilized as a shield to protect the twelve-
year-old girls."'' The court offered no explanation for this distinction, yet
there is little doubt that the family of the sixteen-year-old female victim in
B.B. was equally confused by the court's failure to "shield" her from the
defendant, instead choosing to "shield" him from punishment.,
The court then reiterated that Jones, among other things, stood for the
proposition that minors should be protected from sexual exploitation, which
the court deemed to be a compelling state interest.162 It appears that one of
the similarities between J.A.S. and Jones rests in the notion of exploitation as
a compelling state interest. In Jones, the court was dealing with an adult-
minor situation, where the court found it easy to see the propensity for
sexual exploitation. 163 Similarly, the age disparity in J.A.S. seemingly led
the court to conclude that the state had a compelling interest. 16 Therefore, it
might be argued that the court reasoned if the minor victim was quite young
or if the age disparity was significant, the danger of sexual exploitation
would rise to a level that supported adjudicating the older minor delinquent.
This statement is supported by the court's conclusion that "whatever privacy
interest a fifteen-year-old minor has in carnal intercourse is clearly
outweighed by the State's interest in protecting twelve-year-old children
from harmful sexual conduct."'
165
The court also opined on several other issues raised by statutory rape
cases dealing with minors.166 The court made it clear that "minors under
sixteen have no unfettered right to engage in recreational intercourse with
others under sixteen."' 67 Further, T.W. gave the court the power to take steps
158. Id. at 1385.
159. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 260.
160. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1386.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1384. "We noted that Jones implicated an adult-minor situation where 'the
crux of the State's interest ... [was] the prevention of exploitation of the minor by the adult."'
Id. (quoting B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259).
163. Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1086 (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla.
1991)).
164. J.A.S., 705 So. 2d at 1384.
165. Id. at 1386.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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necessary to prevent minors from participating or being lured into sexual
activity. M Also, the court reasoned that the vast amount of legislation
aimed at protecting minors from sexual exploitation supported the
conclusion that adjudicating a minor delinquent for statutory rape was
consistent with the intent of the legislature.
69
The court also found that punishment could be achieved through the
least intrusive means because of the "rehabilitative" nature of the juvenile
justice system. 17  Particularly, the court pointed to the fact that the
defendants in J.A.S. were not charged as adults and therefore could not be
sentenced to the possible "maximum fifteen-year prison sentence."'1' The
rationale that the defendants were not charged as adults begs the question
whether the court would have found differently if the defendants were
charged as adults.
As dictum, the court offered, "[i]f we blinded ourselves to the unique
facts of each case, we would render decisions in a vacuum with no thought
to the serious consequences of our decisions for the affected parties and
society in general."' This appears to be an attempt to reconcile the court's
arguably inconsistent holdings with respect to privacy rights of minors found
in T.W., Jones, B.B., and J.A.S. It is also likely that the court is illustrating
the difficulty they encounter when trying to fashion a workable and clear-cut
test to deal with statutory rape where the defendant and victim are both
minors and the activity was "consensual."
IV. CONCLUSION
Certain conclusions may safely be drawn from the somewhat confusing
line of cases cited above. Perhaps the safest conclusion can be drawn from
the court's hard-line stance with respect to adult-minor "consensual"
intercourse. It seems clear that the court will not recognize any privacy
right to "consensual" intercourse between an adult and minor because of the
overwhelming propensity for sexual exploitation of children. 73 Though less
clear, it might also be argued that the court is willing to adjudicate
delinquent minors who engage in "consensual" intercourse with young
children or where the age disparity is significant. The most confusing
question is whether the court is willing to allow a minor to be charged when
the age between the consenting minors is the same or very close.
168. Id. at 1386; see also T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193 (holding "a minor's rights are not
absolute").
169. J.A.S., 705 So. at 1385.
170. Id. at 1386.
171. Id. at 1386-87 n.15.
172. Id. at 1387.
173. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994).
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The failure on the part of the legislature to craft statutes that finally
determine these issues has forced the court to make difficult choices with
respect to a minor's right of privacy. The fear of endorsing behavior the
court clearly finds reprehensible, coupled with the court's need to decide
issues based upon constitutionality rather than moral beliefs, has left the
court in the difficult quandary of deciding between rights, morals, and
political views. These are not easy choices, especially because the court is
supposed to be apolitical, leaving its own political, moral, and religious
predilections behind when stepping onto the bench.
Regardless, the fact remains, the court is dealing with an intimately
sensitive subject that calls into question present day values and beliefs
concerning an individual's sexuality. At what age does one begin to
understand and comprehend the potential life long decisions arising from
sexual activity? Does the existence of deadly sexually transmitted diseases
such as AIDS allow more leeway for the court to restrict privacy rights to
protect younger people who might not have the capacity to understand the
ramifications of their actions? Having raised these questions, it seems
logical to ask whether these are questions the court should be answering. If
these questions, which go to the heart of an individual's personal autonomy,
should not be answered by a panel of judges, then it is the duty of Floridians,
who have already made a commitment to privacy rights, to force their
legislators to craft statutes that clearly address and reflect the sentiments of
people of the State of the Florida.
Gregory R. Beck
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